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 Effects of Agri-Environmental Payment Policies on
Agricultural Trade
Joseph Cooper,  Mark Peters, and Roger Claassen
Abstract
In many OECD countries, including the U.S., interest in developing agri-environmental
payment programs is currently strong. In the future, the inclusion of an agri-environmental
payment program into the WTO’s “green box” could be more easily challenged by WTO
member countries on the basis that it has more than “minimal” trade-distorting impacts on
production. The goal of this paper is to conduct an ex ante analysis of the trade impacts of
stylized examples of agri-environmental payment programs that have been proposed for
implementation in the near future. To simulate the production and trade impacts of these
programs, we use a partial equilibrium model of the U.S. agricultural sector in a sensitivity
analysis across a range of design options for agri-environmental payments. For the three agri-
environmental payment scenarios evaluated, the maximum change in exports ranges from a 7
percent decrease (wheat) to a 1 percent increase (soybeans). We do not expect the programs
that decrease U.S. production, which would tend to have an upward  pressure on world
commodity prices, to be challenged before the WTO.
I. Introduction
Cooper, Johansson and Peters (2003) present an environmental assessment of agricultural
trade liberalization. As outlined in that paper, interest in assessments of this type is strong,
with numerous agencies and organizations around the world sponsoring or calling for such
activities.  However, scant attention has been paid to empirical assessments of the converse
issue. Namely, what are the impacts of agri-environmental programs on agricultural trade?3
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) completed in 1994 under the
auspices of GATT, differentiated domestic support policies into various “boxes” according to
their effects on production and trade.   “Green Box” policies, or domestic farm programs that
meet certain criteria for causing minimal trade distortions, including many agri-
environmental programs, were exempted from any expenditure limits.
Agri-environmental payment programs can improve the environmental performance
of agriculture and provide an alternative source of farm income (Claassen and Horan; Batie;
Lynch and Smith; Smith; Feather and Cooper). Programs that have both environmental and
farm income objectives are sometimes referred to as “green payment” programs. The 2002
Farm Act creates a new program that can both improve environmental performance and
provide some income support to producers. The Conservation Security Program (CSP) can
provide payments that exceed the cost-sharing provided by existing programs (e.g., the
Environmental Quality Incentives Program, or EQIP) for the adoption and/or maintenance of
environmentally benign best management practices (BMPs). Beginning in 2003, producers
participating in CSP could receive cost-sharing in amounts similar to that provided by EQIP
for practice adoption, plus cost-sharing for the maintenance of previously adopted practices,
plus other payments that will depend on the producer's overall level of conservation effort
(i.e., the number of resource concerns addressed and whether these concerns are addressed on
all or only part of the farm).
Unlike commodity program payments, agri-environmental programs meeting the
design criteria for the WTO’s ‘green box’ would not be subject to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) limits on subsidizing production. The CSP is an example of such a
program, and is essentially an analog to several types of EU agri-environmental subsidies4
allowed under their Reg. 2078/92.
2  Article 13 (“due restraint”), otherwise known as the
“Peace Clause,” of the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture, protects countries using subsidies
that comply with the agreement from being challenged under other WTO agreements.
Without this “peace clause”, under the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement
and related provisions, WTO-member countries would have greater freedom to take action
against each others’ subsidies.  However, the peace clause is due to expire at the end of 2003.
In the future, an agri-environmental payment program that meets the “basic criteria” and
“specific criteria” required for its inclusion into the WTO’s “green box” could nonetheless
challenged by WTO member countries on the basis that it does not meet the “fundamental
requirement” for inclusion in the green box.
3  Namely, after expiration of the peace clause,
even agri-environmental programs that technically satisfy the “criteria”  outlined in the green
box text could be challenged if some country estimates that the program has more than
“minimal” trade-distorting impacts on production.
4  On the other hand, the peace clause could
be renewed. In any case, the concept of the green box is an economic concept, and  policy
instruments that fall into this category are supposed to be minimally trade-distorting (Josling,
2000).
                                                
2 EU agri-environmental programs are expatiated on in Bernstein, Cooper, and Claassen
(2003) and <http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/envir/programs/evalrep/text_en.pdf>.
3 The “fundamental requirement” for domestic support programs is “that they have no, or at
most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production.” Accordingly, all measures
for which exemption is claimed shall conform to the following “basic criteria”: “a) the
support in question shall be provided through a publicly-funded government program
(including government revenue foregone) not involving transfers from consumers;  and, b)
the support in question shall not have the effect of providing price support to producers.”
In addition, payments under environmental programs must meet the following policy
“specific criteria” and conditions: “a) Eligibility for such payments shall be determined as
part of a clearly-defined government environmental or conservation programme and be
dependent on the fulfilment of specific conditions under the government programme,
including conditions related to production methods or inputs; and b) The amount of payment
shall be limited to the extra costs or loss of income involved in complying with the
government programs.”  (http://www.wto.org/wto/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag_02_e.htm).
4 The peace clause is discussed at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd10_peace_e.htm.5
The goal of this paper is to conduct an ex ante analysis of the trade impacts of stylized
examples of potential agri-environmental payment programs. As actual programs of the type
we consider here are not yet implemented in the U.S., we consider several hypothetical
programs that are discussed in the next section. To simulate the production and trade impacts
of these programs, we use the USMP partial equilibrium model (see the appendix).
II. Agri-environmental Program Scenarios
To maintain consistency with other ERS research on agri-enviromental payments, we
consider the trade impacts of the agri-environmental program scenarios considered in
Claassen et al. (2001).  We examine the impacts of the programs on exports of the three
major grains (corn, wheat, and soybeans) for three scenarios that cover a range of
conservation activities and farm income support objects.  The two bases for conservation
payments are good performance and improved performance. Good performance refers only to
the state of environmental performance, without regard to when that performance was
achieved, while improved performance refers only to actions undertaken in the context of
program enrollment. In these hypothetical scenarios, the environmental objective is to reduce
water quality damage due to sediment.  Estimates of sediment damage, including that to
freshwater recreation, ditch maintenance, municipal and industrial water uses, navigation,
water storage capacity, and flooding, are roughly $287 million per year (Feather, Hellerstein,
and Hansen, 1999; Ribaudo, 1989).  At the farm level, soil conservation or erosion reduction
is the focus of the program alternatives.
Our stylized scenarios do not precisely match any existing or pending program.  We
analyze some program designs that are relatively inefficient in terms of targeting, and as
such, can be expected to have relatively large market impacts. Programs that are targeted
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toward farms that are best able to achieve the environmental objectives and in which
payments are more carefully tailored to producer costs (even if payments exceed those costs
by some modest amount) can be expected to produce greater environmental benefits, at a
lower cost to the economy, and with less commodity market impact. Payments are based on
erosion rates or erosion reductions and are not crop- specific.  While different crops do have
different erosion consequences, payments do not depend directly on crop choice. For each of
our three scenarios, we look at a range of payment rates that result in programs that spend as
much as $3 billion in agri-environmental payments to producers.  The upper end of this range
is as much, or more than, anticipated expenditures for the new Conservation Security
Program (CSP), for which the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates expenditures of
$2 billion over 10 years.  Moreover, the estimated potential to increase production, and
decrease world prices, would most likely be larger for our scenarios than for CSP, given that
CSP has stronger acreage limits than any scenario evaluated here.
The good performance base requires the farmer to use a “low rainfall erosion”
production system, i.e., a production system with a rainfall erosion rate below that for a
system using a predominant crop rotation in combination with conventional tillage on the
same soil and in the same region. Essentially, this example was chosen as being
representative of fairly basic environmentally benign production practices that many farmers
already use. Payments per acre under our hypothetical program are equal to soil conserved
(tons per acre) multiplied by a payment rate per ton of soil conserved. Soil conserved is the
difference between: (1) the maximum erosion rate observed for any production system for a
given soil in a given region (the reference level); and (2) the estimated rate of erosion for the7
“low rainfall erosion” system in use on the same soil in the same region. Payment rates used
in the analysis range from $1 to $4 per ton of soil erosion reduction.
5
The good performance base is further broken down into two policy scenarios –
sodbuster and no sodbuster – that have potentially different implications for farm income and
expansion of commodity production. Good performance with the sodbuster scenario is
similar to sodbuster provisions of current commodity policy, and farmers in the program who
bring previously uncropped highly erodible land (HEL) into production lose other farm
program benefits. With the good performance with no sodbuster scenario, farmers in the
program who bring previously uncropped highly erodible land (HEL) into production do not
lose other farm program benefits. Hence, we would expect a priori that the good
performance with no sodbuster program would be more likely to increase production than
that with the sodbuster provision.
The improved performance base requires the farmer to reduce erosion from pre-
program levels. Payments are based on actual erosion reduction from pre-program levels
rather than erosion relative to the reference level. Payments per acre under our hypothetical
program are equal to erosion reduction (tons per acre) multiplied by payment rate per ton of
erosion reduction. Payment rates used in the analysis range from $4 to $14 per ton of erosion
reduction
6. Payment rates are higher than under the good performance standard because the
                                                
5 For the good performance base, payment to a specific production system is calculated
as: ) 0 , max( ki
r
k k e e s −  where k indexes regions (a geographic area/soil combination), k s is the
payment rate for region k, 
r
k e  is the "reference level" for region k, and ki e is the erosion rate
for system i in region k. The incentive is fixed so the program size (total government subsidy
expenditure) is endogenous.
6 For the improved performance base, payment to a specific production system is calculated
as:  ) ( k
b
k k e e s −  where  k s  is the payment rate for region k, 
b
k e  is the erosion pre-program
baseline, and ek is erosion. Essentially each USMP region is treated as a representative farm.
Again, the incentive is fixed so the program size (total government subsidy expenditure) is
endogenous.8
program budget (up to $3 billion) can support higher payment rates when funds are focused
only on erosion reduction.
The simulation results of the improved performance base can serve as a useful
comparison to those from the good performance with sodbuster as the former is reminiscent
of the more economically efficient existing USDA programs that provide financial incentives
to adopt BMPs only to farmers that do not currently use the BMPs.  One would not expect a
priori that this improved performance base program would lead to expanded crop production.
In fact, the higher the payment, the more willing the farmer is to reduce erosion, and
subsequently, the more likely production is to fall; the improved performance scenario
requires that erosion be reduced throughout the farm, and hence, initiation of crop production
on grass/forest land would count against the producer in terms of total erosion. Hence, the
meeting of this expectation by the simulations serves as a check on the reliability of the
model.
III. Results of the Analysis
For analyzing the impacts of the three programs on production and exports, the scenarios are
integrated into the USMP model of the U.S. farm sector. The domestic impact of the
alternative program designs are measured in three ways: water quality benefits, the change in
farm income, and net costs to the economy. Water quality benefits per ton of soil erosion
reduction vary spatially as shown in fig. 1 (see the appendix for a discussion of the derivation
of the estimated dollar value of water quality damage per ton).  Net economic cost is the
change in total agricultural producer and consumer incomes that result from the subsidy
program. These costs include the direct cost of changing production management or
conservation practices to reduce erosion and indirect costs such as the loss of commodity9
output if producers shift to less erosive but less productive production systems
7. Payments to
producers are not a net cost to the economy, but rather a transfer from taxpayers to
agricultural producers
8.
Water quality benefits are modest relative to net economic costs. The values the
public places on reductions in soil erosion have been estimated for the following
environmental amenities: municipal water use, industrial uses, irrigation ditch maintenance,
road ditch maintenance, water storage, flooding, and soil productivity (Ribaudo et al., 1990;
Ribaudo, 1986), freshwater-based recreation (Feather et al., 1999), and navigation (Hansen et
al., 2002).   Of course, these represent only a subset of the environmental amenities affected
by sediment. Among the amenities not included are increases in waterfowl populations,
cleaner coastal and estuarine recreation areas, population survival of endangered species, and
quality of commercial fisheries. Therefore, the values used here should be viewed as a
minimum estimate of total environmental benefits. For the improved performance base, water
quality benefits exceed net economic costs for programs of roughly $1.1 billon or less (fig.
2). For larger programs, net economic cost exceeds water quality benefits. For the good
performance with sodbuster scenario, net economic costs are equal to or exceed water quality
benefits over the full range of program sizes analyzed.  For good performance without
sodbuster, previously uncropped HEL land is eligible for subsidy payments, so crop
production expands significantly onto uncropped HEL, resulting in a net increase in soil
erosion and an increase in water quality damage.
                                                
7 Government expenditures for program implementation are a real cost to the economy but
could not be included in our modeling framework.
8 Raising government funds through taxation to make these payments imposes real costs on
the economy. The economic cost of taxation is the value of economic activity lost due to the
tax. Taxes on productive resource will reduce the utilization of those resources. For example,
an increase in the tax on labor income may prompt some workers to leave the workforce,
reducing production.  While the magnitude of these costs is unknown, reasonable estimates
range from 20 and 50 cents for each dollar of additional tax revenue (Browning, 1987).10
Farm income gains are significant across all policy designs analyzed (fig. 3). For the
improved performance base, farm income gains exceed producer payments because
commodity prices rise (and hence, consumers pay more), albeit modestly. Much of the
payment also translates directly into farm income gains because some erosion reduction can
be achieved at a cost lower than the payment offered.  For example, for a payment of $5 per
ton of erosion reduction, producers would take all erosion reduction actions that could be
achieved for $5 per ton or less.  For the good performance base, producers mostly collect
payment for past conservation actions and do little to further reduce soil erosion. Commodity
prices are largely unaffected, and hence, consumers are not affected. Payments pass through
more-or-less directly to farm income.
Figures 4 through 6 present the changes in U.S. exports as a function of the agri-
environmental payments by crop.
9  Note, however, that in the analysis, payments are not
varied explicitly by commodity.  The actual payment system splits the nation into 90 zones
(45 USMP regions each with a non-HEL and an HEL soil).  For all three commodities, the
improved performance program leads to exports falling as agri-environmental payments
increase, with a 7 percent fall in the case of wheat. Exports increase under the good
performance without sodbuster provision scenario for all three commodities. Exports are
essentially flat, with only slight increases under the good performance with sodbuster
scenario for all commodities except wheat, which experiences a slight decrease. This
decrease is due to some shifting of production from wheat to the other commodities as
stewardship payments increase. This switching is likely a consequence of soil conserved
varying by commodity, and hence, stewardship payments differing slightly by commodity.  If
                                                
9 In our partial equilibrium model for the U.S. agricultural sector, world prices move along
the import and export functions as determined by the import and export demand and supply
elasticities.  Of course, as the model is otherwise limited to the U.S. sector, it cannot
incorporate any more advanced game theoretic principles about how the other countries
might react than what is contained in these elasticities in the import and export functions.11
we consider the export increases in percentage terms, the maximum changes for the program
with the maximum increase in exports – namely, good performance with no sodbuster
provision  – are very small. With increases of less than 0.5% in the case of corn and
approximately 1% for the other two, we donot expect major impacts of the program on the
world prices of the commodities, even with this particular program that actually lowers
environmental benefits.  The 7 percent fall in wheat exports associated with the improved
performance scenario is a more notable impact on world trade, but one unlikely to be
challenged by other WTO members.
IV. Conclusion
As a result of the Uruguay Round in 1995, WTO members agreed that funding for most
domestic support policies (through the Aggregate Measure of Support) would have to be
reduced. However, an exception was made for agricultural support policies that have a
minimal impact on production and trade. Such policies are exempt from funding reductions
and are commonly referred to as green box policies.
Given the current interest in the U.S. in expanding agri-environmental payment
programs, an important question is whether or not some of these potential programs have
more than a “minimal” impact on production and trade.  We would expect a priori that cost
sharing agreements that simply cover the cost difference per acre of adopting
environmentally benign management practices would have a minimal impact on production
and trade. However, addressing the question becomes more complex when the farm
stewardship payments have the potential to increase income.
The results of our analysis of potential agri-environmental payment programs in the
U.S. suggest that they would present minimal trade distortions. While “minimal” in the WTO
definition is not defined and is open to interpretation (Nelson, 2002), the maximum increase12
in predicted exports, at around 1%, is relatively small.
10  In practice, within the WTO trade
negotiations context, countries tend not to challenge programs that decrease production, as do
some of the scenarios discussed here. As such, inclusion of these programs into the WTO
‘green box’ should draw little concern on the basis of their contribution to trade-distortion.
On the other hand, the three programs considered here may not meet the specific “green box”
criteria, which states that producers should not be compensated for more than their costs of
adopting the practices, and could be challenged on that basis, at least after the Peace Clause
expires in 2003.  However, more carefully targeted and tailored policies may not be as easily
challenged. Note that, as of August 2002, while many of the over 260 disputes brought before
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body since its inception address agricultural issues, none
specifically target agri-environmental programs.
A potentially interesting line of research would be to examine the production and
trade implications of EU agri-environmental payment programs allowed under regulations
EC 2078/92 and 1257/1999.  Agri-environmental policy in the EU is in fact now a part of the
EU’s policy on rural development. Due to this inclusion, it can be difficult to separately
identify EU rural development programs (i.e., programs that generally address farm income
issues) from agri-environmental programs.
 11  For example, EU regulation (as embodied in
EC 1257/99) allows for compensatory payments to farmers who produce in less-favored
areas, such as mountainous areas, areas threatened with abandonment, or areas in which “the
maintenance of agriculture is necessary to ensure the conservation or improvement of the
environment, the management of the landscape, or its tourism value.”
 12 13
                                                
10 In addition, an increase in production and consequent decrease in price as a result of an
agri-environmental program could be of domestic policy concern in the extent that it
increases the cost of traditional commodity programs such as price supports.
11 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/envir/index_en.htm for an example of the EU’s
integration of rural development and conservation.
12 See <http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/envir/programs/evalrep/text_en.pdf> for more
detail on EU agri-environmental programs.13
A second implication of our analysis applies to potential policy responses to the
environmental consequences of agricultural trade liberalization. For instance, it could be
possible to respond to regional increases in environmental consequences by targeting those
regions with higher levels of farm stewardship payments in order to increase conservation
program adoption. Our results demonstrate that the effects of the farm stewardship payments
on trade are likely to be small, and hence, bode well for devising a system of harmonization
of trade and environmental policy, or perhaps more feasibly in the short run, for developing
agri-environmental policy responses to trade-induced environmental consequences.
                                                                                                                                                       
13  EC 2078/92 is the forerunner to EC 1257/99.14
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Fig1. Estimated Water Quality Damage from Soil Erosion
Sources: Ribaudo, 1989; Feather, Hellerstein, and Hansen, 1999; Davison
and Hansen, 2000.17
aProducer payments are the government expenditure for payments to producers, excluding
conservation planning, technical assistance, and enforcement costs. Measured cost reflects
the change in total income in the economy required to produce the agri-environmental gains
due to the subsidy program, including the direct cost of changing production management or
conservation practices to achieve environmental gains and indirect costs such as the loss of
commodity output if producer shift to less erosive but less productive production systems.
The measured costs reported here do not include (1) payments to producers, (2) government
expenditures for program implementation, and (3) economic costs of raising taxes to fund
government program expenditures. Producer payments are not included because they are
transfers of income from taxpayers to agricultural producers rather than actual costs to the
overall economy.
Fig. 2. Water Quality Benefits as a Function of Payments to Producers
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Fig. 3. The Relationship Between Farm Income and Conservation Program Payments for
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Appendix. U.S. Mathematical Programming Model (USMP)
 To consider the effects of alternative environmental policies on traded volumes and
agriculture’s environmental performance, we employ USMP, a regional model of the U.S.
agricultural sector.  USMP is a comparative-static, spatial and market equilibrium model of
the type described in McCarl and Spreen (1980).  The model incorporates agricultural
commodity, supply, use, environmental emissions and policy measures (House, McDowell,
Peters, and Heimlich, 1999).  The model has been applied to various issues, such as design of
agri-environmental policy (Claassen et. al., 2001), regional effects of trade agreements
(Burfisher et al., 1992), climate change mitigation (Peters, et al., 2001), water quality
(Johansson and Kaplan, 2003; Kaplan and Johansson, 2003;  Ribaudo et al., 2001; Peters et
al., 1997), irrigation policy (Horner, et al., 1990), ethanol production (House et al., 1993),
wetlands policy (Heimlich et al., 1997; Claassen et al., 1998), and sustainable agriculture
policy (Faeth, 1995).
  USMP estimates equilibrium levels of commodity price and production at the regional
level, and the flow of commodities into final demand and stock markets.  Geographic units
consist of 45 model regions within the United States based on the intersection of the 10
USDA Farm Production Regions and the 25 USDA Land Resource Regions (USDA, SCS,
1981).  Within each region, highly erodible land (HEL) is distinguished from non-HEL.
Twenty-three inputs (e.g., nitrogen fertilizer, energy, labor) are included as are 44 agricultural
commodities (e.g., corn, hogs for slaughter) and processed products (e.g., soybean meal,
retail cuts of pork).  Crop production systems are differentiated according to rotation, tillage,
and fertilizer rate.  Production, land use, land use management (HEL, non-HEL, crop mix,
rotations, tillage practices), and fertilizer applications rates are endogenously determined.
Substitution among the production activities is represented with a nested constant elasticity of23
transformation function.  Parameters of the nested-CET function are specified so that model
supply response at the national level is consistent with supply response in the USDA’s Food
and Agriculture Policy Simulator (McDowell, Kramer, Randall, and M. Price) an
econometric estimated national level simulation model of the U.S. agriculture sector. The
version of the model used in the analysis has the same elasticities as the ERS/Penn State
Model.
USMP explicitly models producer risk with respect to selection of nitrogen fertilizer
application rates.  Producer selection of nitrogen fertilizer application rates will depend on the
expected returns and producers perception of risk to those returns.  Producers’ perceptions of
risk are represented in USMP with a risk premium that increases exponentially with the
reduction in nitrogen fertilizer application rates from the base application rate. While
reducing nitrogen fertilizer application rates will reduce the variation in net returns it may
also reduce the yield attainable under good growing conditions.  Producers, however, are
likely to be more concerned with making sure that yields are not constrained by lack of
nitrogen to the plant under good growing conditions than they are with the costs associated
with over application of nitrogen fertilizer under poor growing conditions.  Consequently,
producers will likely view the reduction of their nitrogen fertilizer application rates below
that needed to achieve maximum yields under good growing conditions as risky, and will
require a premium above that of the expected return for reducing their fertilizer application
rates below what they believe to be needed to assure maximum yields under good growing
conditions.
Major government agricultural programs, chiefly the Flexibility Contract Program
(FCP), the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), and conservation compliance are also
represented. The most important of these for this analysis is conservation compliance, which
limits expansion of production onto HEL by requiring producers to forego FCP and CRP24
payments when bringing new HEL into production without implementing an approved
conservation system.
On the demand side, domestic use, trade, ending stocks and price levels for crop and
livestock commodities and processed or retail products are determined endogenously.  Trade
is represented with excess demand and supply curves, with the assumption that there is no
policy response by the rest-of-world to U.S. environmental policies.  Hence, trade volumes
respond to changes in prices. USMP allocates production practices regionally based on
relative differences in net returns among production practices by region.
With data from U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) production practice surveys
(Padgitt et al. , 2000), the USDA Long-Term Agricultural Baseline (USDA, WAOB, 1998),
the National Resources Inventory (USDA, SCS, 1994), and the Erosion/Productivity Impact
Calculator (Williams et al., 1990), USMP is used to estimate how changes in environmental
or other policies affect U.S. input use, production, demand, trade, world prices, and
environmental indicators.
Environmental indicators include soil erosion, losses of nitrogen and phosphorous to
ground and surface water, volatilization and denitrification of nitrogen, nitrogen runoff
damage to coastal waters and erosion damage.
14 
15  Environmental emissions for each crop
production activity were obtained from simulations of the production activities using the
Environmental Policy Integrated Climate model, or EPIC (formerly known as the Erosion
Productivity Impact Calculator) (Williams et al., 1990). EPIC utilizes information on soils,
weather, and management practices, including specific fertilizer rates, and produces
information on crop yields, erosion, and chemical losses to the environment. For the
                                                
14 Denitrification is the process by which nitrogen is released to the atmosphere due to bacterial action in wet
and compact soils and volatilization occurs when fertilizer applied releases directly to the environment. The sum
of these is the USMP indicator “nitrogen loss to the atmosphere.”25
simulations management practices and initial fertilizer application rates were set consistent
with agronomic practices for the 45 regions as reported in the USDA’s Cropping Practices
Survey. Yield and environmental indicators—such as, nitrogen losses and erosion—were
then estimated by running each of the cropping systems represented in USMP through EPIC.
Take, for example, the process of constructing USMP’s erosion indicator.  In the first step,
yields were obtained by running EPIC for 7 years for each crop in the rotation with erosion
rates set at zero  and the distribution of rainfall and temperature set to match reported rainfall
and temperatures for the seven-year period from 1989-1995 for each region.  Erosion rates
were set at zero  to ensure that the yields were a function of weather and not of losses in soil
productivity. Average yields by crop for each region were calculated from NASS county data
for this same time period and used to evaluate EPIC’s performance in simulating crop
growth.  EPIC based average yields by crop and region came within 10 percent of average
reported yields for these crops and regions over the seven-year period. The environmental
indicators were then obtained by running the systems through EPIC with erosion rates set at
zero for a period of sixty years.  This permitted the systems to be run through two complete
cycles of the weather distribution, removing the effect of particular weather pattern on the
results.  For the estimation of nitrogen losses, a similar two-step process was repeated for
nitrogen application rates representing 10-, 20-, 30-, 40-percent reductions from their initial
values.
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